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Summary 
 
This thesis is devoted to competition law aspects of parallel trade regulation in the 
European Union. The long line of case law of the European Court of Justice and the 
European Commission reflects the changes of the approaches towards the problem of 
parallel trade restrictions, where the very first cases establish the fundamental framework 
and policies for development of the internal market through the free movement of goods, 
and the most recent jurisprudence aims to review those approaches in the light of the rule 
of reason and efficiency gains policy with the focus on welfare of final consumers. 
This paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of the long-term development of 
parallel trade in the European Union. In that regard, special attention is paid to the 
fundamental approaches to the freedom of parallel trade elaborated in Consten and 
Grundig case and their further development into the “restrictions by object” policy. The 
last is subject to critical assessment in context with its application in pharmaceutical 
sector. The recent judgements of the ECJ in the GSK Greece and GSK Spain cases open a 
new page in the history of parallel trade in Europe, and their evaluation is therefore of 
very big importance for this research. 
Another point of interest concerns the comparison of the European experience on 
parallel trade regulation with the respective approaches elaborated in the newly 
established Common Economic Space (CES), the free-trade area of Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
This Master thesis concerns one of the most crucial aspects of the European Union 
competition law, namely – the agreements and concerted practices, which impede parallel 
trade between Member States. As the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union1 
aims first and foremost at establishment and development of the internal market, the 
European Court of Justice has interpreted those provisions in the light of their application 
to the problems of parallel trade restrictions, which makes its jurisprudence the principal 
source for analysis in this research. Beginning with the fundamental judgements in 
Dassonville2 and Consten and Grundig3, and ending with the most recent cases of GSK 
Spain4 and Greece5, the Court has consistently developed its policy and approaches to the 
restrictions of parallel trade, reflecting the necessary changes arising in context of single 
market development. 
Thus, the recent changes to the policy of “restrictions by object” in context of anti-
competitive agreements and the policy of “per se abuse” of dominant position have 
resulted in re-assessment of the fundamental framework of competition enforcement and 
its transformation in favour of the rule of reason and efficiency gains approach, where 
consumer welfare alongside with the establishment of the internal market is regarded as 
one of the fundamental goals of the TFEU. 
While the policy on  parallel trade has traditionally been implemented by means of 
the respective case law, it is also important to assess the relevant regulatory framework 
(e.g. Block Exemption Regulations, Guidelines on Vertical Restrains), which is of great 
value for practical application. 
                                                
1 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as of 9 May 2008, 
OJ C115/47; 
2 Case 8-74, Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville, ECR 1974/837 [1974];  
3 Joined cases 56 and 58-64, Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v 
Commission of the European Economic Community, ECR 1966/299 [1966]; 
4  Case C-501/06P, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission of the European 
Communities, ECR I-09291 [2009]; 
5 Case C-468/06, Sot Lélos kai Sia EE and Others v GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon 
Proïonton, ECR I-07139 [2008]; 
 5 
Although the main point of interest of this paper concerns the experience of 
parallel trade development in the European Union, its comparison with the relevant 
problems of parallel trade in the newly established Common Economic Space (CES) free-
trade area of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan is another point of interest6. This issue is 
very relevant to the discussed above as the fundamental principles of CES functioning are 
almost equal to those which are effective in the European Union. 
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis can be formulated as follows. First it aims to review the 
theoretical, legal and historical background of parallel trade development in context of 
competition law of the European Union. Secondly, this paper is mainly dedicated to the 
analysis and assessment of the recent case law of the ECJ, which introduced significant 
changes into competition law policy on parallel trade in pharmaceutical products. Finally, 
a comparative analysis between the EU and CES approaches towards parallel trade is of 
special interest for this research. 
1.3 Method 
The methods to be used during this research are the traditional legal dogmatic, 
comparative legal and historical method. The traditional legal dogmatic method is 
applicable for the analysis of the existing legislative material, case law and respective 
doctrinal studies in order to reveal both the required information concerning the 
development of parallel trade and doctrinal points of view on the respective problem 
areas. The historical method shall be used in order to assess the development of the policy 
in historical context, taking into account the objectives of European competition and 
judicial authorities at the certain period of time. The comparative method will be applied 
both in order to compare the novels in parallel trade regulation introduced by the 
European Court of Justice to the established policy, and for comparison of European 
experience with the rules of the new free-trade area of Eurasian Economic Community.  
                                                
6 “Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan are launching common economic space Jan. 1”, RiaNovosti [web 
page] (2013) <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20120101/170583110-print.html>, accessed May 13, 2013; 
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1.4 Material 
Provided that the nature of parallel trade regulation in the European Union is very 
case-law oriented, this research is to significant extent based on the analysis of the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ and the Commission, namely the following cases: Consten and 
Grundig, GSK Spain, Syfait7 and Sot Lélos (Syfait II). Respective doctrinal studies, 
articles and researches constitute the basis for critical analysis of the case law and 
regulatory framework. 
1.5 Delimitation 
This paper is primarily aimed at assessment of competition law aspects of parallel 
trade in the European Union. Provided that parallel trade also concerns a number of 
intellectual property rights aspects, those aspects will be discussed only to the extent 
necessary to achieve the main goal of the research. 
1.6 Outline 
This thesis consists of six chapters; the first and the last are the introduction and 
the conclusion. The second chapter concerns the notion of parallel trade and provides the 
necessary theoretical background. The third chapter covers the most fundamental aspects 
of development of parallel trade in the European Union, while the fourth deals with the 
new developments and challenges in that area. The fifth chapter examines the current 
situation with parallel trade in the CES free-trade area. 
  
                                                
7  Case C-53/03, Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akarnanias (Syfait) and Others v. 
Glaxosmithkline AEVE, ECR I-04609 [2005]; 
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2 The Notion of Parallel Trade 
To analyse parallel trade issues first and foremost definitely requires understanding 
of what parallel trade is and how it works. In that regard it seems reasonable to review the 
very basic theoretical and historical background in order to provide the basis for further 
research.  
Thus, once goods are produced they are introduced into certain markets by their 
manufacturer through distribution, agency, licensing and other kinds of agreements or 
even by the manufacturer itself through establishing its own retail networks. 
Controversially, parallel trade occurs when the party to the above listed agreements or any 
third party, who has no direct relation to the manufacturer, subsequently re-sells those 
products from their original market to the consumers on the market of any third country, 
which means that those products end up at the market other than originally intended by the 
manufacturer. “Such practice has been described as “parallel trade” to the extent that it 
takes place outside and – in most cases – in parallel with the distribution network that the 
manufacturers or original suppliers have established for their products”8. 
The main and possibly the only reason why parallel trade has emerged is price 
differentials between the same products sold in different markets. Thus, for example, 
manufacturer might sell its products both to A and B countries, but due to several reasons 
the price in country A would be much lower. Hence, business units would try to make 
profits by exporting cheaper products from country A and selling them at a higher price in 
country B. Moreover, there could also arise cases of parallel trade if the manufacturer does 
not sell its products in country B at all or does it on the terms different from those applied 
to country A9. 
2.1 Parallel Trade Origins 
Therefore, it is obvious that the reason why parallel trade does exist and what 
makes it so attractive for merchants is the price differentials between various markets. 
However, in order to conduct a comprehensive analysis it is also crucial to understand 
                                                
8 Commission Communication “On parallel imports of proprietary medicinal products for which 
marketing authorisations have already been granted”, Brussels, COM(2003) 839 as of 30 
December 2003, p. 6; 
9  Christopher Stothers, Parallel trade in Europe: Intellectual Property, Competition and 
Regulatory Law (Oxford : Hart, 2008), p. 2; 
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their nature.  According to the doctrinal studies, there can be a variety of reasons for such 
price differentials as described above10. Those are some of them11: 
a) Price regulation: respective national authorities can legislatively fix price 
on certain kinds of goods. For example, price on pharmaceuticals is 
controlled by some Member States of the European Union; 
b) Product regulation: some jurisdictions may impose regulatory requirements 
on certain types of products, which would increase producer’s costs and 
therefore the final product’s price; 
c) Distribution costs: it is obvious that distribution costs may widely vary 
from country to country. For example, transportation and labour 
expenditures would be lower in Eastern Europe and much higher in 
Scandinavian countries; 
d) Manufacturer’s pricing policy: due to different level of welfare in different 
countries in order to achieve better sales performance and business results 
manufacturers might adopt the price of its products to the certain country 
specifics; 
e) Currency exchange rates: taking into account that national currencies have 
fluctuating exchange rates, manufacturers, as well as potential parallel 
traders may take advantage of it. 
Moreover, price differential is the main but no the sole factor which facilitates 
parallel trade. It is worth mentioning that as opposed to official full-service distributors, 
parallel importers are free to choose their business strategies and therefore are independent 
of manufacturers when it comes to the way the product is marketed.12 Thus, unlike official 
retailers they do not have to incur additional expenses of promoting or after-sale servicing 
of the product, what lets them be more efficient and maintain consumer-friendly level of 
pricing.  
                                                
10 Richard M. Andrade, “The Parallel Importation of Unauthorized Genuine Goods: Analysis and 
Observations of the Gray Market”, U. Pa. J. Int’l Bus. L., 1993, Vol. 14:3, p.p. 413-417; 
11 Stothers, Op. Cit., p. 3; 
12 Ibid.; 
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2.2 Intellectual Property And Competition Law Collision 
Approaches to such business practice are different in different jurisdictions and 
depend both on national competition and intellectual property rights policies. Thus, the 
main and the most efficient instrument used for parallel trade regulation on national level 
is the doctrine of IPR exhaustion, depending on which parallel trade can be both legal and 
illegal. Exhaustion doctrine presumes that once a product protected by intellectual 
property right has been marketed with consent of intellectual property rights owner, those 
rights of commercial exploitation over this given product can no longer be exercised, as 
they are “exhausted”13. 
National exhaustion principle makes parallel trade illegal, as it would infringe 
rights of trade mark owners (or licensees) who are in that case the sole entities authorised 
to import and market products on the territory of the respective country. Consequently, 
international or regional doctrines open possibilities for parallel trade either on 
international or regional level. 
Within the context of intellectual property law it should be mentioned that markets 
of goods, which have been imported by parallel traders are commonly referred to as “grey 
markets” and the goods are consequently called “grey market goods”. Despite such 
terminology has slightly negative meaning describing the “unofficial” channels of 
importation of those goods, they shall not be regarded as counterfeits as long as parallel 
trade is legal (otherwise, they are treated as counterfeits). Products brought into a market 
by parallel traders are still manufactured by their trademark owners or authorised entities 
and therefore there are no reasons to treat them differently from the “officially” 
imported14. 
However, intellectual property law as such shall not be regarded as the sole 
regulator of parallel trade. The dispute whether limitation of parallel trade by means of 
trademark law is justified seems to be one of the most ambiguous issues discussed by the 
researchers. One way or another, there exists a very tight bound between intellectual 
property and competition law, which demonstrate totally different approaches to the issue 
in question. Thus, while the purpose of IP law is to protect intellectual property and 
                                                
13 “International Exhaustion and Parallel Importation”, World Intellectual Property Organization 
[web page] (2013), 
<http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/export/international_exhaustion.htm> accessed 19 April 
2013; 
14 Andrade, Op. Cit., p. 411; 
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exclude any third parties from unlawful use of trademarks, producers take advantage of it 
and use it in order to restrict parallel trade, as described above. Depending on the 
exhaustion doctrine applicable, as soon as such restrictions begin distorting competition, 
they might fall in breach with competition law. This clearly indicates that concerning the 
issue of parallel trade those two branches of law are principally in conflict. The solution in 
this case is rather simple: either to acknowledge parallel trade as a legal practice and 
introduce regional or international IPR exhaustion principle, or controversially restrict it 
by means of national exhaustion principle, excluding any legal possibilities of parallel 
imports. Both of the described approaches are nowadays presented in different 
jurisdictions around the world. It is therefore hardly possible to clearly answer, which one 
is more advantageous, as both of them pursue different objectives that are of importance 
for a particular situation. 
2.3 Parallel Trade: Positive Effects And Drawbacks 
Therefore, assessment of positive effects and drawbacks of parallel trade on a 
doctrinal level would provide an objective understanding of all the necessary aspects 
concerning the way it influences trade and affects both manufacturers of the products and 
consumers.  
2.3.1 Free-Rider Problem 
It seems reasonable to begin with possible drawbacks, which are commonly 
referred to by the opponents of parallel trade freedom. It is very a widespread 
contemplation that parallel trade facilitates free riding on investments into trademark 
development made by its owner, which can be described as follows. There exist certain 
types of products, especially those for which brand name is of special importance, that 
require considerable efforts from the trademark owner dedicated towards creation of 
demand for it, what also includes building of a trademark integrity15. Therefore, it seems 
“undesirable to allow an unauthorised importer to reap the benefits of the trademark’s 
goodwill without contributing to mark holder’s investment”16. Hence, a parallel importer 
might make its benefits from the third party’s trademark (which is its property) depriving 
it of some share of revenues. 
                                                
15 Ibid., p. 428; 
16 Ibid.; 
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In addition to trademark free riding, several authors claim that both manufacturers 
and distributors incur costs of building their territorial markets through advertising, 
discounting, and post-sale service maintenance and therefore prefer protection from 
competition by parallel importers who can simply buy the goods abroad without incurring 
similar costs17. 
However, those arguments are in fact not convincing enough and can definitely be 
overcome. It is clear that the conclusion that parallel traders do not contribute into creation 
of a brand image and have nothing to do with maintaining trademark’s goodwill is more 
than inaccurate and unfounded. Thus, exactly like manufacturer’s authorised resellers, 
actors on the parallel trade market have to compete with each other and therefore need to 
promote and support image of the products in question, which means that they actually do 
invest their efforts into the image of the brand18. This argument may however not work for 
luxury goods, where marketing manner may be of a superior importance, but such cases 
are additionally covered by the specifics of exclusive or selective distribution systems, 
which aim to minimise possibilities of free riding. 
From the average consumer’s prospective what really matters is the quality of the 
product in question and its special features, which have generally nothing to do with the 
way this product is marketed – through official distribution channels or by parallel traders. 
In this context parallel trade does not facilitate free riding but on the contrary creates 
additional benefits for the manufacturer through increasing of sales volumes and providing 
additional promotion to the brand19. 
The next counter-argument to the free-riding problem concerns the fact that, 
despite distributors usually participate in advertising of the product, promotion and 
maintenance of the brand goodwill is to large extent funded by the manufacturer itself20. 
Thus, manufacturers usually reasonably aim to exercise full control over advertising 
activities of their product in order to ensure the integral approach to its market positioning 
in all the markets concerned. This means that on the strategic level it is the producer who 
                                                
17 Keith E. Maskus, “Parallel Imports In Pharmaceuticals: Implications For Competition And 
Prices In Developing Countries” [web document] (2001), World Intellectual Property 
Organization <http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-ip/en/studies/pdf/ssa_maskus_pi.pdf>, 
p. 21; 
18 Andrade, Op. Cit., p. 428; 
19 Ibid.; 
20 Ibid., p. 429; 
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makes biggest investments into the trademark, which to a greater extent affect its value. 
Hence, “the unauthorized importer contributes to the costs of trademark capital indirectly 
through the manufacturer’s pricing mechanism, even if it spends less money on 
independent goodwill”21. 
All those considerations are persuasive enough to indicate that the problem of free 
riding on the goodwill of a trademark may in most cases not create any negative effects on 
its owner, unless it concerns luxury products as mentioned before. Hence, the argument 
stating that free riding infringes intellectual property rights of the manufacturers should be 
treated very critically. 
2.3.2 Trademark Erosion Problem 
It is very commonly argued that parallel trade negatively affects the perception of a 
trademark, which finally results in trademark erosion and decrease of its value22. This 
argument is very relevant to the one discussed above and actually is its logical 
consequence. Therefore, in line with previous reasoning, real negative effects in that case 
may arise just to the products belonging to luxury sector of the market. When it comes to 
mass-market products, parallel trade does not foster trademark erosion and does not 
generally lead to infringement of its owner’s intellectual property rights. On the other 
hand, presence of parallel importation channels may increase competitiveness of the 
market in question and encourage investments into the trademark development 23 . 
However, taking the aforementioned into consideration, going too much into detailed 
analysis of this argument does not seem reasonable for the purposes of this research. 
2.3.3 The Problem Of Consumer Deception 
 The problem of consumer deception consists in the assumption that parallel traders 
mislead their customers by selling unofficially imported goods as if they were distributed 
through authorised channels. Thus, it is argued that as trademarks are usually regarded as 
indicators of products quality, buying them from unauthorised resellers would confuse the 
customer as he or she does not know what quality to expect24. 
                                                
21 Ibid.; 
22 Ibid., p. 431; 
23 Ibid.; 
24 Maskus, Op. Cit., p. 4; 
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 This argument sounds very sophisticated and is not justified at least due to the sole 
fact that grey market goods are not fakes or simulations, but genuine products. This being 
so, it is obvious that for the average customer it is of minor importance how the product is 
marketed, but the brand of the product and its quality are decisive. As those criteria are 
equivalent for the authorised and unauthorised products, there exists nothing to be treated 
as a deceit. Consumer deception would only occur if lower-quality parallel imports were 
marketed as legitimate versions of higher-quality products25. 
 It also might be stated that during their distribution from the producer to the final 
consumer some kinds of products require special treatment, such as special transportation 
conditions or permanent quality control26. It may be relevant, for example for foodstuff or 
hi-end fragile equipment, which may lose their consumer characteristics because of wrong 
transportation or storage. Hence, opponents of parallel trade claim that, unlike official 
distributors, parallel traders usually neglect special safety and quality control requirements 
and therefore gray market goods may be of lower quality than authorised imports. To 
some extent this argument is legit and it is true that parallel traders do not have any legal 
obligations towards the manufacturer concerning products treatment, while official 
distributors always have the risk of being rejected because of improper performance. 
 However, one shall always bear in mind that even though producer does not 
exercise any control over parallel traders, they still have to compete with each other and 
official dealers, and therefore they will do their best in order to provide products of the 
genuine quality. As long as parallel importers want to stay on the market and win as much 
consumers as possible, it is not in their interest to sell goods of lower quality and 
undermine their reputation. Moreover, it is also important to remember that in order to 
obtain market authorization, products are always subject to control by competent 
authorities, which ensure compliance of the goods with statutory requirements. Thus, alike 
the two previous cases, the assumption that parallel trade engenders the problem of 
consumer deception is definitely outweighed by the objections stated above. 
2.3.4 What Are The Consumer Benefits? 
 One shall summarise that as it appears from the analysis of the most commonly 
referred possible parallel trade disadvantages, even if they do negatively affect producers 
                                                
25 Ibid.; 
26 Andrade, Op. Cit., p. 430; 
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or final customers, the losses for them would obviously be minimal. In that regard, it is 
important to assess whether consumer benefits of parallel trade can outweigh the 
drawbacks and evaluate the overall effects. 
 The predominant positive effect originating 
from parallel trade concerns the issue of market 
competitiveness. Thus, it has been multiply repeated 
earlier that parallel trade dramatically encourages intra-
brand competition, defined as competition among 
distributors or retailers of the products marketed under 
the same trademark. Parallel import is regarded as the 
most efficient instrument, which ensures effective 
competition between gray market goods and those 
imported through official channels, as a result forcing the importers to improve their 
market performance and increasing overall market effectiveness. The very basic economic 
supply-demand theory perfectly illustrates that parallel import as an additional supply 
channel results in price reductions and provides consumers with additional range of 
choices. 
 Therefore, parallel trade also aims to adjust the level of prices on the basis of 
competitive market concept, excluding possibilities of price discrimination between 
different markets, as excessively high or low prices would result in loss of customers and 
market share, which will be immediately taken over by parallel traders. In other words, 
parallel trade provides an important degree of arbitrage between the price levels in 
different countries, which “helps to ensure that prevailing price levels between different 
national markets can not differ more than a margin representing the parallel trader’s 
transaction costs”27. 
In that respect one shall summarise that “the customer loss from restricted 
competition that results if parallel imports are restricted is greater that the loss caused by 
confusion when parallel goods are allowed to enter the market”28. This seems to be the 
most balanced and justified approach towards the problem of parallel trade, which in the 
context of global trade gives priority to the doctrine of free trade leaving protectionist 
measures behind as having anti-competitive and anti-integration character. 
                                                
27 Van Bael & Bellis (eds.), Competition Law of the European Community, 5th Edition (Alphen aan 
den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2010), p. 212; 
28 Andrade, Op. Cit., p. 435; 
Graph. 1 
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2.3.5 Total Welfare Concept and Parallel trade 
Provided that parallel trade in line with the consumer welfare concept is obviously 
beneficial for final consumers, it is however arguable that manufacturers gain the same 
substantial advantages from it. In that respect one shall refer to the total welfare concept, 
which reflects “the combined welfare of the consumer and producer, that is, consumer 
surplus plus producers’ gross profit on the product”29. From that prospective it is clear that 
manufacturers generally disfavour opening markets to parallel importation because this 
limits their capacity to charge different prices in different markets and therefore to 
increase the producer’s surplus30. 
When it comes to economical assessment of parallel trade effects on total welfare, 
it is hardly possible to provide a blanket answer to the question whether it contributes to 
its improvement or not. The case-by-case analysis shall be undertaken in order to compare 
possible drawbacks associated with lower price discrimination (such as lower incomes) 
and positive effects originating from the increased competition faced by the monopoly 
producer in the importing country31. 
Several economic-oriented researches in that regard have been conducted in order 
to assess comprehensive effects of parallel trade from various prospects, clearly showing 
that those effects fully depend on a huge variety of factors, such as the product in 
question, the size of a respective market, competitiveness of the sector as such, etc.32 
Nevertheless, the recent findings have demonstrated that there are two cases where the 
effect on the total welfare of allowing parallel trade can be stated unambiguously33. Those 
cases concern the nature of the differences between national markets where parallel trade 
occurs. Thus, “parallel trade might increase total welfare when it takes place between two 
countries with the same level of income and patient co-payments, and different drug needs 
… in some countries than in others. On the other hand, parallel trade between 
                                                
29 Pieter Kalbfleisch, “Aiming for Alliance: Competition Law and Consumer Welfare”, Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice, 2011, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 111; 
30 Frederick M. Abbott, “Parallel Importation: Economic and social welfare dimensions” [web 
document] (2007) <http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/parallel_importation.pdf>, accessed 6 May 
2013; 
31 Panos Kanavos, et al., The Economic Impact of Pharmaceutical Parallel Trade in European 
Union Member States: A Stakeholder Analysis (London ; LSE Health and Social Care, London 
School of Economics and Political Science, 2004), p. 33; 
32 See e.g. Frank Müller-Langer, "Parallel Trade and its Ambiguous Effects on Global Welfare", 
Review of International Economics, 2012, Vol. 20, No. 1, 177-185; 
33 Kanavos, Op. Cit., p. 34; 
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industrialised countries, characterised by similar high-income levels and epidemiological 
conditions, and different drug reimbursement levels, might decrease total welfare”34. 
One way or another, one shall admit that the concept of total welfare is rather 
complicated when the question of its practical implication arises, as it requires the clear 
and correct understanding on the way in which the interests of consumers and producers 
(distributors) shall be balanced. In context of parallel trade the total welfare approach is 
misleading, as it will always result in a situation, where the manufacturers will try to 
increase their welfare by preventing parallel trade, and by doing so, they will affect the 
welfare of final consumers, and the other way around. Thus, it is quite difficult to reach a 
conclusion whether from the prospective of total welfare policy parallel trade may 
produce any positive economical effects, such as ensuring lower prices on the market and 
enhancing competition. Taking the above mentioned into consideration, one may 
reasonably assume that the total welfare doctrine may be inconsistent with the objective of 
market integration, where free movement of goods and parallel trade development are of 
crucial importance, since it creates incentives for partitioning of the market and impedes 
intra-brand competition.  
Therefore, in the light of market integration goal competition authorities are in 
general reluctant to accept the total welfare standard as a guiding principle and apply 
instead the doctrine of consumer welfare, which expressly encourages parallel trade as an 
instrument facilitating intra-brand competition and therefore contributing to the welfare of 
ultimate consumers 35 . This does not however mean that the consumer-oriented 
competition policy therefore completely ignores the interests of manufacturers. A good 
example of interaction between those two approaches has been demonstrated by the ECJ 
in its recent judgments on parallel trade in pharmaceuticals, which will be subject to 
further analysis. 
  
                                                
34 Ibid.; 
35 Kalbfleisch, Op. Cit., p. 111; 
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3 Parallel trade in the European Union 
Looking back into the history of the European Union establishment one shall keep 
in mind that it was created in the aftermath of the Second World War with the sole 
purpose of fostering economic integration between the counties of Europe, which at that 
time had to face serious challenges. Thus, back in 1958 the fundamental idea of the 
organization called European Economic Community (EEC) was to create the single 
market for all its members, which would ensure sustainable development of the region. 
Nowadays, when the EEC has evolved into the European Union pursuing not 
merely economical aims, but being also a powerful political institution, establishment and 
functioning of the internal market still remains its primary goal. Thus, Article 26 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as “TFEU” or 
“Treaty”) manifestly stipulates that “internal market shall comprise an area without 
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties” 36. 
3.1 Free Movement of Goods 
  The background described above is crucial for understanding of the approaches 
towards parallel trade elaborated by the executive and judicial authorities of the European 
Union. Despite there are no references to parallel trade as such in the Treaty and 
consequently there are no fundamental provisions of secondary legislation, it is clear from 
the well established case law of the European Commission and the European Court of 
Justice (hereinafter referred to as “the ECJ”) that the Community law nevertheless 
implicitly encourages parallel trade in the internal market. 
  In that respect it is necessary to focus on the principle of the free movement of 
goods, which being the basic framework for trade between Member States, has huge 
potential when it comes to its practical implication. According to Article 28 TFEU, “the 
Union shall comprise a customs Union which shall  cover all trade in goods and which 
shall involve the prohibition between Member States of customs duties on imports and 
exports and of all charges having equivalent effect”.  
                                                
36 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as of 9 May 
2008, OJ C115/47;  
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 Thus, the basic framework for enforcement of the free movement of goods 
principle is laid down in Article 34 TFEU, which prohibits both Member States and the 
Union itself37 from adopting any quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures 
having equivalent effect within the internal market. This concept has been further 
developed by the early case law of the ECJ, which defined what exactly “measures having 
equivalent effect” should mean. In the Dassonville case from 1974 the ECJ ruled that “all 
trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or 
indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered as measures 
having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions”38. Such a broad interpretation of 
the Treaty provisions which is commonly referred to as “Dassonville formula” “tends to 
support an approach to Article 34 as the basis for an economic constitution for EU: 
maximizing the right for individuals to participate on the market on whatever terms they 
choose, and providing them with a vehicle to challenge any national rule which – even 
potentially and indirectly – stands in their way”39. This abstract clearly illustrates that the 
authorities of the European Union have made a lot of efforts towards harmonization of the 
single market, which definitely includes freedom of parallel trade, a derivative from free 
movement of goods principle.  
However, effectiveness of all the Treaty provisions, as well as the respective case 
law, prohibiting Member States from “applying measures hindering free circulation of 
goods would be undermined if businesses could simply re-erect barriers to intra-
Community trade through the imposition of vertical restrains inhibiting parallel 
imports”40. In other words, private parties would make useless the “free movement” policy 
by simply restricting their business activities to certain territories and excluding any 
possibilities of free movement by contractual terms.  
3.2 Territorial restrictions: competition law and parallel trade 
Due to the reason mentioned above the authorities of the European Union have 
always demonstrated a hostile approach to territorial restrictions and other ways of 
                                                
37 Case C-114/96, Criminal proceedings against René Kieffer and Romain Thill, ECR I-03629 
[1997]; 
38 Case 8-74, Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville, ECR 1974/837 [1974];  
39 Catherine Bernard, The substantive law of the EU: the four freedoms (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), p. 74; 
40 Van Bael & Bellis, Op.Cit., p. 210; 
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impeding trade (including parallel trade) between Member States, especially those 
attempted by private parties. In order to address such attempts the Commission and the 
ECJ have to invoke competition provisions of the TFEU, especially those on the 
prohibition of absolute territorial protection and other types of vertical restrains. 
According to Article 101 TFEU, “all agreements between undertakings, decisions 
by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between 
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction 
distortion of competition within the internal market shall be prohibited as incompatible 
with the internal market”. 
3.2.1 Consten and Grundig Case 
The first fundamental case to deal with the problem of parallel trade restrictions 
under Article 101 TFEU was Consten and Grundig41, which arose before the ECJ as early 
as 1966. The Court had to assess the exclusive distribution agreement, where Consten, a 
French company, was appointed as the sole representative of Grundig, a German supplier, 
in France. Thus, Consten undertook to exclusively purchase electronic household 
appliances from Grundig and to sell them on the French market under the contractual 
obligation not to resell them directly or indirectly to other countries. Similar was used for 
the whole distribution network around Europe. 
In order to make such restrictions legit distributors in different countries were 
granted the exclusive right to use the “Grundig” trademark, excluding any third parties 
from legal possibilities of re-selling branded products. Moreover, national distributors 
undertook to register under national law their own trademark “GINT” as the appliances 
supplied by Grundig were branded as “GINT”. 
The case arose when a third-party company UNEF succeeded to purchase Grundig 
appliances from German traders who delivered them in spite of the export prohibition 
imposed by Grundig and resell them on the French market at more favourable prices. 
Consten found such practice illegal due to the trademark infringement and unfair 
competition reasons and filed an action against UNEF, which ended up before the 
Commission and has been subsequently challenged before the ECJ. 
                                                
41 Joined cases 56 and 58-64, Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v 
Commission of the European Economic Community, ECR 1966/299 [1966]; 
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Therefore, there were several issues to be solved by the Court. As it follows from 
the definition of an anti-competitive agreement, in order to determine its anti-competitive 
nature it is necessary to establish two principal facts – whether it affects trade between 
Member States and whether distortion of competition constitutes its object or effect.  
Hence, it is important to assess the notion of agreements “which may affect trade 
between Member States”. In line with the doctrine of free movement of goods, the ECJ 
noticed that the agreement falls under the prohibition of EU competition law only to the 
extent when such agreement may affect trade between Member States. Hence, “what is 
particularly important is whether the agreement is capable of constituting a threat, either 
direct or indirect, actual or potential, to the freedom of trade between Member States in a 
manner which might harm the attainment of the objectives of a single market”42. This 
approach led the Court to the landmark conclusion that agreements imposing territorial 
restrictions or other limitations on freedom of trade and limiting possibilities of parallel 
trade in the internal market indisputably affect trade between Member States and therefore 
satisfy the requirement laid down in the Treaty. 
Another fact that requires assessment for legal qualification of an anti-competitive 
agreement is its influence on the competition itself. As follows from the afore-mentioned 
definition, the Treaty prohibits agreements, which have the “object” or “effect” of 
competition restriction. In that regard one shall bear in mind that European competition 
law treats the principle of freedom of competition as having various stages and 
manifestations, namely – inter- and intra-brand competition. The Commission and 
European Courts’ condemnation of restrictions on parallel trade is essentially motivated 
by the promotion of intra-brand competition43.  
Thus, the second landmark conclusion delivered by the Court in Consten and 
Grundig made it clear that restrictions to parallel trade shall be regarded as restrictions “by 
object” and therefore they are “automatically” caught by Article 101 TFEU even without 
any economic analysis and assessment of actual or potential negative effect44. The court 
stated that for the purpose of Article 101 TFEU there is no need to take account of 
concrete effects of an agreement once it appears that is has as its object restriction of 
competition. When entering into contractual relations, which impose territorial restrictions 
                                                
42 Ibid., p. 341; 
43 Van Bael & Bellis, Op.Cit., p. 209; 
44 Christopher Stothes, “ECJ Rules on GSK’s “Dual Pricing” of Pharmaceuticals in Spain”, 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2010, Vol. 1, No. 2, p.p.123; 
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aiming to impede free movement of goods through partitioning of the internal market, the 
parties obviously intend to shelter respective national markets from possible effective 
competition. 
Moreover, the decision in question explicitly declared that any further 
considerations of possible positive effects of such agreements on inter-brand competition 
or other economic benefits should not be regarded as reasonable justifications for escaping 
from Article 101 TFEU. 
3.2.2 Hardcore Restrictions and Block Exemption Regulation 
In the assessed judgement of Consten and Grundig the ECJ demonstrated an 
extremely hostile approach to any vertical restrictions, which have the potential of 
impeding competition, by declaring them incompatible with Union law as anti-competitive 
by object and leaving no possibilities for their justification under article 101(3) TFEU. 
Despite being inspired by pro-competitive intentions and aiming to create benefits 
for the consumers, such kind of policy obviously deteriorated the position of businesses. 
Thus, in some cases by imposing vertical restrains a company has the only reasonable way 
of marketing its products. For example, it can be absolutely true for producers of luxury 
goods where the way of product marketing is crucial for the brand image. 
In order to mitigate the consequences of Consten and Grundig ruling, in 1967 the 
Commission introduced the so-called “Distribution Regulation”45, which aimed to exclude 
certain kinds of anti-competitive vertical agreements from the scope of Article 101 TFEU. 
 The current version of Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (hereinafter referred 
to as “VBER”) revised in 201046 provides a “safe harbour” for the parties to the vertical 
agreement47 in case they hold market share not exceeding 30% of the relevant market 
each, and the agreement does not contain so called “hardcore” restrictions. The latter are 
of special interest for this research. 
                                                
45 Commission Regulation No 67/67/EEC “On the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to 
certain categories of exclusive dealing agreements” of 22 March 1967, OJ 57/849; 
46 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 “On the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted 
practices” as of 20 April 2010, OJ L102/1; 
47 As defined in Article 1 VBER, “vertical agreement” means an agreement or concerted practice 
entered into between two or more undertakings each of which operates, at a different level of the 
production or distribution chain, and relating to the conditions under which the parties may 
purchase, sell or resell certain goods or services; 
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Thus, VBER contains a list of hardcore restrictions – the restrictions, which 
preclude the benefit of exemption of a vertical agreement from the rules of Article 101 
TFEU under this regulation. Where such a hardcore restriction is included in an 
agreement, that agreement is presumed to fall within Article 101(1)48. Despite the 
regulation does not explicitly provide any guidelines on parallel trade restrictions as such, 
it does however deal with the issue of territorial restrictions. As follows from Article 4 
VBER, the exemption shall not apply to such vertical agreements, which have as their 
object the restriction of the territory into which a buyer party to the agreement may sell the 
contract goods or services. In other words, restriction on passive sales and parallel trade as 
such constitute the hardcore restriction and in no way can benefit from the VBER. 
Territorial restrictions as described in the VBER have further on been subject to 
detailed review in the Guidelines on Vertical Restrains issued by the Commission. Thus, 
territorial restrictions depending on the way they are implemented in the vertical 
agreement can take both direct and indirect forms. 
a) Direct Territorial Restrictions 
The situation when provisions of a vertical agreement explicitly limit distributor’s 
activity (including advertising activities, etc.) with its contractual territory and directly 
preclude the possibility of reselling products to other markets within the internal market 
has already been assessed in Consten and Grundig case and therefore there is no need to 
go much into details of this kind of restriction. However, further development of the case 
law made it clear that territorial restrictions fall in breach with Article 101 TFEU even if 
they are implemented in a way not formally binding for the parties concerned49. The fact 
of their actual observance by the parties is also irrelevant to find an anti-competitive 
nature of an agreement, due to the assumption that the mere potential existence of such 
restrictions “may create a “visual and psychological” effect, which contributes to a 
partitioning of the market”50. 
In that regard, it is necessary to make an emphasis on the fact that the Commission 
and the ECJ have traditionally considered such restrictions as having the object of 
                                                
48 Commission Notice “Guidelines on Vertical Restraints” (2010/C 130/01) as of 19 May 2010, OJ 
C130/1, para. 47; 
49 See e.g. Commission Decision 82/853/EEC National Panasonic, OJ L-354/28 [1982]; 
50 See e.g. Case T-66/92, Herlitz AG v Commission of the European Communities, ECR II-00531 
[1994]; 
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restricting competition and therefore falling within the scope of Article 101 TFEU even 
without the assessment of potential or actual negative effects on competition51. 
b) Indirect Territorial Restrictions 
Alongside with direct forms of export prohibition, there also exist a variety of 
other indirect means to restrict parallel trade on the internal market, which are generally 
caught by Article 101 TFEU. Despite some of the practices to be discussed further may be 
regarded as both legal or illegal depending on various circumstances, it is still necessary to 
assess the general approach towards the most common forms of indirect territorial 
restrictions. 
1. Refusal to supply concerns the agreements where the supplies are geared to 
distributor’s obligation of not engaging into export outside its contractual territory 
and parallel trade activities. “Accordingly, refusals to supply, limitations of supply 
or even threats to refuse or to limit supply may infringe Article 101(1) where the 
reseller’s conduct suggests an “understanding” on his part that it will lose supplies 
if resells product outside its territory”52. 
A derivation from refusal to supply policy, the so-called “referral policy”, may 
also fall within the scope of Article 101 TFEU. Thus, the supplier may impose an 
obligation on the distributor to refer any potential customers outside its territory to 
the respective distributor in such customers’ home region. 
2. Product differentiation as a practice falling in breach with 101 TFEU occurs when 
parties enter into a vertical agreement aiming to preserve differences between 
national markets and therefore restrict parallel trade. Among other ways, most 
commonly differentiation is carried through the trademarks, under which the same 
products are marketed in different countries. Such kinds of restrictive measures 
implemented in the vertical agreements have been subject to the assessment by the 
Commission and the ECJ in Zera/Montedison53 and Dunlop Slazenger54 cases55. 
                                                
51 See e.g. Case C-277/87, Sandoz prodotti farmaceutici SpA v Commission of the European 
Communities, ECR I-00045 [1990]; 
52 Van Bael & Bellis, Op. Cit., p. 224; 
53 Commission Decision 93/554/EEC Zera/Montedison, OJ-L272/28 [1993]; 
54Case T-43/92, Dunlop Slazenger International Ltd v Commission of the European Communities, 
ECR II-00441 [1994]; 
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3. Differential pricing is a pricing policy, where prices for the equal products 
supplied to the distributors may vary depending on the market, which is known to 
be intended for their sale. Thus, the manufacturer aims to charge higher prices for 
products intended for export in order to make parallel trade less favourable for its 
distributors. Alongside with direct differential pricing policy, Article 101 TFEU is 
generally applicable to the cases where the supplier provides discounts, bonuses 
and other incentive measures for the suppliers not engaged in parallel trade. 
4. Warranty restrictions take place when the manufacturer discriminates against 
products purchased through parallel distribution channels by refusing their after-
sales services. Such practice as tending to limit distribution to official channels 
only is generally regarded illegal by the Commission and the ECJ56. 
5. In line with the concept of agreements having the object of restricting competition 
introduced by the decision in Consten and Grundig and developed by further case 
law and VBER, indirect territorial restrictions also fall within this category and 
therefore generally cannot be exempted from Article 101 TFEU.  
Summarizing the discussed above, one shall admit that the Commission and 
European judicial authorities have always treated parallel trade as an effective tool for 
internal market harmonization, while Article 101 TFEU has traditionally served as an 
excellent instrument for the market-integration policy enforcement. This being so, it 
appears reasonable that any justifications of parallel trade restrictions under Article 101(3) 
TFEU based on “price differences due to differing transportation costs, customs duties, 
currency exchange costs and fluctuations, overheads, or governmental price regulation”57 
have been consistently rejected. This well-established approach in its turn has led to the 
legitimate presumption that parallel trade restrictions are in principle non-justifiable. 
However, the most recent development of case law has indicated some on-going 
revolutionary changes in the fundamental policy of parallel trade enforcement. Thus, the 
Commission and the ECJ have recently demonstrated an intention to review their policy 
towards this issue and delivered a number of landmark cases, which overturned their 
                                                                                                                                             
55 However, if a product differentiation occurs as a unilateral act of the supplier, it falls outside the 
scope of Article 101(1) TFEU; 
56 See e.g. Case 86/82, Hasselblad (GB) Limited v Commission of the European Communities, 
ECR-00883 [1984]; 
57 Van Bael & Bellis, Op. Cit., p. 211; 
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approaches to parallel trade in pharmaceutical sector.  Those cases will be subject to 
further assessment in this research. 
  
 26 
4 Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals 
Parallel trade in pharmaceutical market is very different from all other sectors due 
to the fact that it is to large extent shielded from the regular market economy way of 
functioning. On one hand, it concerns the prices of pharmaceutical products, which are 
commonly established by the national authorities of Member States. As there is nothing to 
harmonise prices for equal products between national markets 58 , emerging price 
differentials create distinct opportunities for parallel imports and foster exportation of 
medicines from the “low-price” to the “high-price” countries. On the other hand, being 
responsible for health-care programmes Member States, directly or indirectly, also act as 
the biggest consumers of pharmaceuticals. 
This being so, the support of the Commission and the ECJ given to the freedom of 
parallel trade in the single market resulted in a situation, when the “low-price” countries 
had to face shortages of healthcare products, while pharmaceutical companies kept 
supplying their national markets with the volumes several times exceeding regular 
national consumption59. 
Consequently, pharmaceutical companies reasonably found such manifestation of 
parallel trade inacceptable and “sought to argue that since normal conditions of 
competition are distorted by national regulation, parallel trade should not result in 
imposing one Member State’s pricing policies over the other Member States”60. Moreover, 
uncontrolled supplies of cheap pharmaceutical products through parallel channels to the 
entire of internal market would definitely undermine the financial welfare of 
pharmaceutical companies, which would lose their profits in “high-price” markets. Taking 
into account the highly innovative nature of pharmaceutical business, which requires a lot 
of investments in research and development, lower profits will negatively affect the 
development of new healthcare products. Therefore, a few cases arose before the 
Commission already in the mid-1990’s, when pharmaceutical companies started taking 
measures aimed to parallel trade limitation. 
                                                
58 Commission Communication “On parallel imports of proprietary medicinal products for which 
marketing authorisations have already been granted”, Brussels, COM(2003) 839 as of 30 
December 2003, p. 6; 
59 I. Lianos & I. Kokoris (eds.), The Reform of EC Competition Law (Alphen aan den Rijn : 
Kluwer Law International, 2010), p. 380; 
60 Ibid., p. 377; 
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Prior to the analysis of the relevant case law, it seems reasonable to devote a few 
paragraphs to the specifics of parallel trade in pharmaceuticals, which is not as obvious as 
it might seem to be. 
4.1 Specifics of Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals 
The first distinctive feature of the pharmaceutical sector is the so-called public 
service obligation, under which the manufacturers and distributors of medical products 
must “ensure appropriate and continued supplies of that medicinal product to pharmacies 
and persons authorised to supply medicinal products so that the needs of patients in the 
Member State in question are covered”61. Such an obligation in fact requires the 
manufacturer to organise the long-term planning of their supply chains in order to ensure 
sustainable production of medicines. Despite the public service obligation does not 
expressly declare that the manufacturer must supply as much products as its distributors 
require, the reality is different. Even though the supplies may be enough to cover the local 
demand, parallel traders permanently undertake to export their substantial part, leaving 
hardly any stock for local consumption and therefore creating deficiency on the market. In 
the absence of supplies prioritization requirement, pharmaceutical company ends up again 
under the obligation to recover that deficit, and while doing so contributing to the never-
ending circle of supplies and exports by its wholesalers. 
This being so, the manufacturer on one hand has to plan its production and 
constantly supply its distributors in “low-price” markets, while on the other hand, has no 
legal way to limit parallel trade and ensure that consumers’ needs are covered. 
Another specific aspect of parallel trade in the pharmaceutical sector concerns its 
modest pro-competitive effects. Thus, unlike other markets, parallel trade in 
pharmaceuticals cannot be presumed to create any substantial benefits for final consumers. 
As follows from the research of economic effects of pharmaceutical parallel trade 
conducted by the LSE, it is rather obvious that neither final consumers (patients), nor 
health insurance organizations do accrue any material benefits from parallel trade, while at 
the same time the only real beneficiaries are the parallel traders and to a much smaller 
                                                
61 Directive 2001/83/EС of the European Parliament and of The Council “On the Community code 
relating to medicinal products for human use” as of 6 November 2001, OJ L 311/67; 
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extent – the retailers62. The reason why patients do not win because of the lower prices on 
the grey market medicines is the sole fact that those prices are actually as high as those for 
officially imported products are.  
Due to special requirements to the distribution of medical products, parallel traders 
themselves usually are not engaged in the retail business and therefore limit their activities 
to the re-selling of cheap medicines to authorised pharmacies. The latter in their turn sell 
those products at the price, which is established by the Member State in question, and final 
customers eventually “pay the same amount for the product whether or not it was parallel-
imported”63. The same situation occurs in public healthcare sector, where the savings of 
national healthcare funds from purchasing of parallel-imported medicines do not generally 
exceed 1% of total pharmaceutical expenditures64. 
Those facts clearly demonstrate that unlike other markets, parallel trade in 
pharmaceuticals does not result in substantial (if any) growth of intra-brand competition 
and fostering the development of the sector. On the contrary, it negatively affects the 
possibilities of investments into research and development and therefore tends to reduce 
the overall competitiveness of the respective market. Those arguments were introduced by 
the Spanish subsidiary of GlaxoSmithKline pharmaceutical giant, when the case on the 
restrictions of parallel trade in Spain arose before the Commission. 
4.2 The Glaxo Saga: GSK Spain 
In the middle 1990-s the pharmaceutical market in the European Community 
suffered from parallel imports originating mainly from two countries with the prices for 
pharmaceuticals fixed at a substantially low level, namely – Spain and Greece. 
Pharmaceutical companies operating in this low-priced segment of internal market were 
affected by the growing scope of parallel trade and sought therefore to restrict it by the 
available contractual means. The first landmark case to be analysed in that regard is the 
so-called GlaxoSmithKline Spain, where the ECJ had to answer whether and under which 
                                                
62 Panos Kanavos, et al., The Economic Impact of Pharmaceutical Parallel Trade in European 
Union Member States: A Stakeholder Analysis (London ; LSE Health and Social Care, London 
School of Economics and Political Science, 2004), p. 135; 
63 I. Lianos & I. Kokoris, Op.Cit., p. 385; 
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circumstances manufacturers of medical products can legitimately restrict parallel trade in 
the internal market. 
4.2.1 The Case Background 
In 1998, GlaxoSmithKline Service Unlimited (formerly Glaxo Wellcome SA, 
hereinafter referred to as “GSK”), the Spanish subsidiary of GlaxoSmithKline group, one 
of the world’s largest pharmaceuticals producers, introduced the new General sales 
conditions for its wholesalers in Spain. According to Article 4 of these General conditions, 
GSK established the new “dual pricing” policy, which would let it charge different prices 
for the products to be sold on the domestic market and those for export. In particular, 
under the Spanish law prices for medicines distributed to pharmacies and hospitals located 
in Spain shall not exceed the maximum level set out by health care authorities. However, 
in case of supplies for export GSK decided that sales prices should be determined 
according to real, objective and non-discriminatory economic criteria, which would make 
them far higher and consequently eliminate parallel trade expediency. “In so doing, GSK 
aimed to restrict parallel trade in its medicines in which Spanish intermediaries were 
engaging on account of the price differentials between Spain and other Member States”65. 
The Commission’s Decision 
In order to seek an individual exemption of such a provision from being caught by 
Article 101(1) TFEU, GSK notified the European Commission of the new General terms. 
At the same time, the “dual pricing” provision was challenged by a number of wholesalers 
before national competition authorities. 
In 2001, the Commission delivered the Decision on GSK’s exemption request, 
where it found that the new terms did fall within the scope of Article 101(1) and could not 
be exempted from it under Article 101(3) TFEU due to the fact that “such conditions have 
as their object and effect restriction competition and affect trade between Member States 
to an appreciable extent within the meaning of Article 101(1)” 66. This conclusion was 
made both on the basis of the existing case law and the economic analysis made by the 
Commission, which let it come up with the opinion that “dual pricing” clause “produced 
                                                
65 “Commission must re-examine GSK’s Spanish sales conditions”, EU Focus, 2009, 263, p. 7; 
66 Commission Decision 2001/791/EC GSK Spain, OJ L302/1 [2001], para. 189; 
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an effect tantamount to that of an export ban in a considerable number of cases…”67. That 
decision was appealed by GSK before the Court of First Instance (the General Court). 
Court of the First Instance Judgment 
In 2006, the CFI completely overturned Commission’s decision by first declaring 
that the clause restricting parallel trade did not have an anti-competitive object per se but 
only had anti-competitive effect. This statement amounted to the reconsidering of the 
well-established policy described above. The Court consistently held that the Commission 
was wrong finding the restrictive object of the agreement in question due to several 
grounds. The most ambiguous and revolutionary issue, which would let it reach that 
decision, was the assumption that the ultimate purpose of Article 101(1) TFEU was 
protection of interests of final customers, i.e. consumer welfare. This lead to the 
conclusion that an agreement limiting parallel trade has the object of restricting 
competition in so far as it deprives final customers of effective competition68. 
Having analysed the relevant market the CFI found that unlike other sectors of 
economy, state regulation of prices on pharmaceutical products makes this market to some 
extent shielded from “regular” supply-demand system of price determination. 
Consequently, it is impossible to presume that parallel trade would always lead to prices 
reduction and therefore increase the welfare of final consumers. Hence, in order to find 
whether the agreement has negative effects it is always necessary to conduct the 
comprehensive analysis. The latter, according to the reasoning of the Court, means that the 
“dual pricing” system has not the object but effect of competition restriction. 
Relying on the described argumentation and having assessed possible negative 
effects of the agreement, the Court finally ruled that the Commission was in principle right 
finding it in breach of Article 101(1) TFEU with the remark that an error of law was 
committed when declaring GSK’s pricing clause anti-competitive per se. Another point of 
criticism in the CFI’s ruling was failure by the Commission to adequately examine 
arguments concerning exemption of the agreement from Article 101 TFEU moved 
forward by GSK and the issues concerning allocation of burden of proof. The Court 
observed that “in order to be capable of being exempted under Article 101(3) TFEU, an 
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agreement must contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress”69. 
Those conclusions were sufficient for the court to annul the Decision of the 
Commission almost in all its points. Logically, all the parties were not satisfied with this 
result and appealed the CFI Decision to the ECJ. GSK asked the ECJ to confirm that the 
agreement concerned did not fall within the scope of Article 101(1) neither as having the 
object nor the effect of competition restriction. The Commission accordingly sought “dual 
pricing” to be recognised as a measure restricting competition by object and therefore 
falling within the scope of Article 101(1) without the possibility of its justification under 
101(3) TFEU. 
The Opinion of AG Trstenjak 
Before starting the analysis of the Decision by the ECJ it is necessary to take a 
brief look at the Opinion delivered by Advocate General Trstenjak in June 2009. The main 
point of the conducted analysis was that the CFI committed an error of law in one aspect. 
Thus, the Opinion states that the Court did not regard the object of parallel trade 
restriction as a sufficient basis to find a restriction of competition by object under 101(1) 
TFEU and wrongfully introduced the requirement of an analysis designed to determine 
whether the General Sales Conditions have as their object or effect the restriction of 
competition on the relevant market, to the detriment of the final consumers70. 
The most significant idea introduced and emphasised by Advocate General in the 
Opinion is the assumption that despite the agreement is restrictive by object, it is not 
however prohibited per se, as there always exits a possibility to present evidence that 
would justify the exemption by proving existence of benefits for final consumers from the 
agreement in question. It is therefore for the Commission to adequately review all the 
presented evidence and take the decision on the possibility of exemption. 
4.2.2 Article 101(1) TFEU – Problems of Interpretation 
As the Case arose before the ECJ, the Court basically had to consider two principal 
issues: whether the “dual pricing” clause violates Article 101(1) as restriction by object or 
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by effect and if it does, is there any possibility to justify such restriction under 101(3) 
TFEU. 
Concerning the first issue the ECJ in line with the Opinion demonstrated an 
orthodox case-law based approach stating that such kind of agreements are doubtless 
subject to prohibition by Article 101(1) as restricting competition by object. The Court 
explicitly stated that the distinction between the “object” and “effect” restrictions should 
be always borne in mind. Thus, finding an agreement restrictive by object always requires 
scrutiny of the agreement itself and the circumstances in which it “works” (e.g. 
pharmaceutical market or motor vehicles market), while revealing “effect” restrictions 
presumes examination of the consequences of the agreement. Moreover, it was 
emphasised that anti-competitive object and effect are not cumulative but alternative 
conditions for assessing whether the agreement falls within article 101(1) TFEU.  
In the next few paragraphs the Court developed the criticism of Advocate General 
concerning the introduction by the CFI of the requirement of proof that the agreement had 
negative effect on final consumers stating that first, according to the wording of Article 
101(1) there is nothing to indicate that only those agreements which deprive consumers of 
certain advantages may have anti-competitive object. Second, and the most crucial aspect 
highlighted by the Court was that besides protection of the interests of final customers, 
article 101(1) also primarily aims to protect the single market structure and competition as 
such, which demonstrates the multi-goal approach to competition law. In that respect the 
Court referred to its recent Sot Lélos case, which established that parallel trade shall 
always be regarded as benefit for final customers, and therefore claimed that restrictions 
on parallel trade are anti-competitive by object even in very special sectors of economy, 
including the pharmaceutical market71. Thus, the ECJ expressly rejected the reasoning 
used by the CFI to explain why the agreement did not fit the category of restrictive by 
object. 
Turning back to the decision of the CFI, it is obvious that its significance and 
revolutionary character were the results of the approach, where “competition was not 
meant as an end itself, but a process that ultimately must benefit consumers” 72 . 
Differences in the approaches demonstrated by the CFI and the ECJ originate from their 
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different positions concerning interpretation of Article 101(1) TFEU and the place of 
consumer welfare doctrine within the existing competition policy. 
In this regard it is important to bear in mind that competition law of European 
Union developed in such economic and historical background, when the main goal was 
establishment and development of single market, while competition law was (and still 
remains) regarded as the main instrument, which would help to reach it. Therefore, it is 
logical that the officially declared paramount value was not the consumer welfare, but 
market integration, which also explains the nature of existing case law. This does not 
however mean that EU Competition law completely disregards the necessity of consumer 
welfare, but interprets it in line with multi-goal policy as the consequence of effective 
policy directed towards protection single market and competition as such.  “Since Union 
competition law is not restricted to economic welfare there was nothing to justify 
departure from the orthodox position that “agreements … aimed at preventing or 
restricting parallel exports, … be agreements whose object is to restrict competition”73. 
 However, in its decision, the CFI did appeal to the consumer welfare principle, 
which overturned the orthodox interpretation of Article 101(1) TFEU. The question is –  
why? The first reason is that in the Court’s opinion consumer welfare principle shall be 
regarded along with the goal of establishment of the internal market as a legitimate aim 
laid down in the TFEU and their treatment as antithetical categories does not make any 
sense.   
In that regard the reference shall be made to the very early case law, especially to 
the Judgement of the ECJ in Consten and Grundig, which was used by the CFI in order to 
demonstrate the role of consumer welfare principle on that landmark decision. As follows 
from the ECJ’s argumentation, while assessing the anti-competitive nature of the 
agreement in question, the Court “did not hold that an agreement intended to limit parallel 
trade must be considered by its nature, that is to say, independently of any competitive 
analysis, to have as its object the restriction of competition”74. On the contrary, “the Court 
of Justice then carried out a competitive analysis, abridged but real, during the course of 
which it held, in particular, that the agreement in question sought to eliminate any 
possibility of competition at the wholesale level in order to charge prices which were 
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sheltered from all effective competition, considerations which led it to reject a plea 
alleging that there was no restriction of competition”75. This line of argumentation is 
aimed to demonstrate that despite agreements tending to limit parallel trade have 
traditionally been treated as having the object of restricting competition, the reason for it 
was not the mere desire to foster the establishment of single market. Thus, the policy of 
absolute protection of parallel trade and market integration have never been an end in 
itself and served as a proxy for safeguarding consumer welfare76. In other words, there is 
nothing but the consumer, who is in very deed to benefit from development of intra-brand 
competition and elimination of artificial market barriers.  
Along with parallel trade restriction, certain kinds of anti-competitive practices 
(such as price fixing) have also been regarded as anti-competitive by object not due to 
their negative economic consequences as such, but because they are most likely capable of 
harming consumer. As from the economic point of view it is almost axiomatic that those 
restrictions will lead to consumer harm, “they are considered to be anti-competitive by 
object, without it being necessary to show any anti-competitive effects”77. 
Those arguments are indirectly supported by the provisions of the TFEU itself, 
where Article 101(3) refers to the concept of consumer welfare in context of possible 
justifications for anti-competitive agreements. Furthermore, paragraph 13 of the 
Guidelines to Article 101(3) TFEU, which is intended to clarify its provisions, expressly 
and unambiguously declares that “the objective of Article 81 is to protect competition on 
the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient 
allocation of resources”78.  
Relying on the discussion above, one shall reasonably conclude, that when the case 
concerns such an extraordinary situation, where it is impossible to presume that an 
infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU may cause harm to consumers, it is therefore 
necessary to assess the actual anti-competitive effects of the agreement in question. In that 
respect it seems appropriate to cite the CFI analysis of the agreement in question, which 
falls in line with the argumentation presented. The Court held that “an analysis of the 
terms of Clause 4 of the General Sales Conditions, carried out in that context, therefore 
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does not permit the presumption that that provision, which seeks to limit parallel trade, 
thus tends to diminish the welfare of final consumers. In this largely unprecedented 
situation, it cannot be inferred merely from a reading of the terms of that agreement, in its 
context, that the agreement is restrictive of competition, and it is therefore necessary to 
consider the effects of the agreement”79. 
Another reason of the revolutionary ruling of the CFI can be presented as follows. 
As discussed in an article by Carlo Petrucci, the concept of an agreement “having the 
object of restricting competition” is actually misleading due to several reasons and has 
been introduced in the TFEU in order to simplify competition law enforcement and 
provide legal certainty for the parties by avoiding examination of anti-competitive 
agreements or behaviour consequences 80 . As described before, the CFI assessed 
pharmaceutical market and found it very special. Hence, the Court found the agreement 
not perfectly falling within the definition as anti-competitive by object and therefore, 
being bound by existing case law tried to find a logically reasoned approach and “mitigate 
the rigour of this concept by introducing the requirement of consumer welfare harm”81. 
Despite the ruling of the CFI seems to be very well reasoned and aimed to re-
assess the approaches towards the notion of restrictions by object, the ECJ did not go so 
far. Both arguments used by the Court of Justice against this decision seem to be 
absolutely logical from the formal (or, “textual”) point of view and standing in line with 
the case law. However, it’s also obvious that the position taken by the Court is somewhere 
in between trying to follow the strict policy boundaries and understanding the 
imperfection of the existing system. 
Those imperfections are the result of the presumption82 that certain types of 
agreements are anti-competitive per se, which does not actually leave any flexibility as 
shown in the present case. The Court had to fit its argumentation to this concept in order 
not to ruin the existing framework of competition enforcement, which works perfectly for 
the majority of cases. Therefore, it had to find another way to compensate this inflexibility 
concerning infringements “by object” and create an approach which would let market 
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actors get out of trouble in case they find themselves in such unobvious situations like 
GSK had to face. 
4.2.3 Article 101(3) TFEU – A New Hope?  
This assumption becomes even more plausible when it comes to the discussion 
whether a restriction caused by the GSK’s agreement can be justified and exempted from 
Article 101(1) TFEU. Despite the ECJ did not accept the revolutionary changes to the 
fundamental framework of competition policy enforcement, its decision however had 
crucial effects for application of Article 101(3) TFEU, which has traditionally been 
regarded as inapplicable to the cases of parallel trade restriction.  Thus, during the 
proceeding at the CFI, GSK sought to challenge Commission’s point that “dual pricing” 
systems impede parallel trade, are illegal per se and therefore cannot be exempted83. 
Article 101(3) TFEU provides the possibility for exemption to such concerted 
practices, which “contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the 
resulting benefit”. On that basis GSK applied for an exemption stating that parallel trade 
would negatively affect development of the sector in question. As pharmaceutical market 
is very innovative and competitive, the company has to make huge investments into highly 
risky research and development business. However, parallel trade doubtlessly reduces the 
profits which pharmaceutical company can invest into research and development, while 
the distributors which gain the biggest benefits from exporting cheap medicines in their 
turn make no contribution to innovative activities. In case parallel trade remained 
unrestricted, GSK would not be able to generate sufficient funds to continue its R&D 
activities and therefore would seriously undermine consumer welfare. On the contrary, 
intensive research and development obviously contribute to development of 
pharmaceutical industry and therefore provide consumers with “a fair share of the 
resulting benefit” in line with the requirement of Article 101(3) TFEU. 
However, such line of reasoning did not satisfy the Commission and it refused to 
apply Article 101(3) by merely stating that it is impossible to be sure that savings 
originating from limitation of parallel trade were destined to be R&D investments84 
without any further examination of the evidence presented by GSK. 
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The Court, along with the opinion of the CFI and the AG Trstenjak held that the 
Commission failed to conduct sufficient analysis in accordance with Article 101(3) TFEU 
and assessed only the possibility that parallel trade would give rise to a loss in competition 
efficiency, leaving behind the arguments regarding possible positive effects for 
consumers85. The most crucial and revolutionary aspect in that respect concerns the 
allocation of standard and burden of proof, as the ECJ claimed that any arguments 
presented by the party seeking an exemption must be assessed by the Commission in light 
of factual arguments and evidence provided, taking into account the specific nature of the 
sector concerned if these are decisive for the assessment. By stating that, the Court in fact 
revised and overturned its orthodox practice of treating the agreements aimed at limitation 
of parallel trade as non-justifiable per se, and recognised the necessity of assessment of the 
economic context of the case introduced and emphasised by the CFI. 
In its decision the ECJ proposed the test for the purposes of assessing possible 
positive effects of the agreement under Article 101(3), according to which such effects 
shall be “sufficiently likely” in order to serve as a ground for exemption. Thus, the 
Commission must make sure relying on the presented evidence whether it seems more 
likely that the agreement in question will create advantages for final consumers or it will 
not86. This does not however mean that the burden of proof is somehow shifted onto the 
Commission from the applicant; the latter is still obliged to present all the existing 
evidence, while the Commission is to ensure that they are properly assessed and taken into 
consideration. As for the present moment, it is still hardly possible to presume which 
kinds of positive effects shall be regarded as sufficient grounds for exempting an anti-
competitive agreement, and it is therefore for the further case law to develop the notion of 
positive effects and provide detailed guidelines on its practical implication. 
Despite the Court offered a solution to assess positive effects as such, there may 
arise a difficulty proving causality between purported higher profits gained if no parallel 
trade was allowed and that these profits will cover high R&D costs, and hence produce 
positive effects. As there are no express tests suggested, the ECJ however commented on 
that aspect that the existence of an appreciable objective advantage does not necessarily 
suppose that all of the additional funds must be invested in R&D87. Therefore, the 
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company seeking an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU must present evidence 
showing the investments into innovative activities from the generated profits, though it 
remains unclear to which extent the R&D activities shall be financed from the funds at 
issue in order to justify the ban on parallel trade. That might have been left by the ECJ 
without any explanation on purpose in order the make special emphasis on the necessity of 
case-by-case analysis, which will ensure the flexibility of the introduced concept for very 
different situations. 
The previous discussion leads to the legitimate conclusion that taking account of 
the nature and specific features of the relevant sector to decide on the applicability of 
Article 101(3) TFEU is obviously the most significant outcome of the GSK Spain 
judgement. This outstanding novelty is however not merely limited to the issue of parallel 
trade restrictions justification and has much broader implications for Article 101 TFEU as 
a whole, as it seems to be a necessary compromise, which the ECJ had to find in order to 
keep the existing policy on presuming some kind of agreements anti-competitive by object 
and providing flexibility in the cases where parallel trade restrictions are in fact not anti-
competitive. One may not without a reason assume that the Court of Justice transferred the 
line of reasoning used by CFI in relation to Article 101(1) on 101(3), and therefore 
mitigated the rigidity of the existing policy. Therefore, the general idea implemented in 
the ECJ’s judgement, rather simple, though revolutionary, can be formulated as follows: 
“although limitations of parallel trade restrict competition according to Article 101(1), 
they should be permitted under Article 101(3), as long as undertakings make a legal 
commitment whereby they undertake to devote the profits generated by such limitations to 
financing R&D”88. 
However, it is worth mentioning that there also may arise problems with this 
concept as it might get inconsistent with existing case law, especially the Sot Lélos case to 
be discussed further stating that parallel trade restrictions are not subject to justification by 
reference to specific features of some economy sectors as such89.  
4.3 The Glaxo Saga: GSK Greece 
As follows from the Bayer/Adalat case, delivered by the ECJ in 2004, “for an 
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agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1) of the Treaty to be capable of being 
regarded as having been concluded …, it is necessary that the manifestation of the wish of 
one of the contracting parties to achieve an anti-competitive goal constitute an invitation 
to the other party, whether express or implied, to fulfill that goal jointly…”90. By 
introducing this definition the Court proposed a test, which aimed first and foremost at 
drawing a clear distinction between practices caught by Article 101 TFEU and unilateral 
conduct. As long as the conditions of the test are not fulfilled, the practice in question 
cannot be regarded as a breach of Article 101 TFEU. 
However, along with the restrictions of parallel trade by means of vertical 
agreements, companies occupying dominant positions on the market are capable of 
applying unilateral restrictive measures, which might be caught by Article 102 TFEU 
covering the cases on abuse of dominant position. In that regard GSK Greece cases are of 
special interest for the analysis of the treatment of parallel trade restrictions under Article 
102 TFEU. 
4.3.1 Syfait I Case 
GlaxoSmithKline AEVE, the Greek subsidiary of GSK group and the national 
supplier of GSK’s pharmaceutical, found itself in a situation almost similar to discussed in 
GSK Spain case, where due to price regulation and excessive development of parallel 
trade it had to impose a unilateral limitation on the volumes of products supplied to the 
Greek market with the purpose of parallel trade restriction. Distributors therefore 
complained to the Greek Competition Committee about the refusal by GSK AEVE to 
supply the ordered volumes. In order to deliver a decision on that application the 
Committee referred the case for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ, asking a rather broad 
question whether a dominant pharmaceutical company may unilaterally refuse to supply 
the distributors with the required volumes in order to limit parallel trade, and whether such 
conduct in itself is sufficient to be rendered abusive. 
Despite this reference was rejected by the ECJ on the procedural grounds as made 
by the non-authorised body, the Court’s Advocate General Jacobs managed to deliver his 
Opinion on the case, which shall be taken into account for the further analysis. Answering 
to the first part of the question AG admitted that in line with the case law an intention to 
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limit parallel trade in principle is sufficient to regard the refusal to supply abusive91. 
Nevertheless, this presumption cannot be relevant for the case at issue, provided that the 
pharmaceutical industry is very different from any other, and therefore it is impossible to 
declare the mere intention of parallel trade restriction abusive per se92. Moreover, from the 
theoretical point of view, the concept of per se illegality is in principle not relevant for the 
abuse of dominant position. Thus, unlike Article 101 TFEU, which prohibits the mere 
existence of an agreement and mostly disregards the behaviour at issue, Article 102 TFEU 
focuses not on the fact of dominance as such, but prohibits its abuse. Provisions of Article 
102 TFEU do not provide a possibility for an exemption as such: either the conduct is 
abusive, or not. And therefore, the analysis is always required in order to establish the fact 
of abuse, which precludes the possibility of per se violation. 
Further detailed assessment with the emphasis on the regulatory and economic 
environment of the sector in question let the AG make a reasonable conclusion that the 
conduct aimed to exclude the possibilities of parallel trade was however justifiable. From 
the doctrinal point of view, “central to Advocate General Jacobs’ Opinion is the fact that 
the restriction of parallel trade in pharmaceutical sector results in no harm to 
consumers”93, while “a requirement to supply would not necessarily promote either free 
movement or competition, and might harm the incentive for pharmaceutical undertakings 
to innovate”94. 
 This line of reasoning closely resembles the consumer welfare concept introduced 
by the CFI in GSK Spain case, and despite concerning different types of anti-competitive 
behaviour, both of them clearly demonstrate the shift of the accents in the approaches to 
enforcement of competition policy from formalistic to the consumer-oriented and 
economically justified. However, the ECJ did not have the chance to comment on the 
Opinion at issue. 
Nevertheless, this case has not remained undecided on the procedural grounds. 
Inspired by the Opinion at issue, the Greek Competition Commission delivered its 
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decision in line with AG Jacobs’ reasoning, which was appealed by the GSK’s distributors 
before the Greek courts claiming that GSK’s conduct be recognised anti-completive abuse 
of dominant position.  
4.3.2 Sot Lélos kai Sia Case (Syfait II) 
Once the case on the appeal of Competition Commission’s decision appeared 
before the Greek court, it decided to stay the proceeding and refer to the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling asking the same questions as the Committee did in Syfait case: whether 
the conduct of a dominant company aimed at restriction of parallel trade is abusive per se, 
and how the specifics of pharmaceutical sector can influence the decision on the first 
question. 
Per Se Abuse  
Therefore, it is first necessary to examine the Opinion delivered by AG R. 
Colomer95, which to large extent differs from the one discussed above. While supporting 
the AG Jacobs’ point that abusive behaviour aimed at parallel trade limitation cannot be 
illegal per se, AG Colomer provided further development of this argumentation. 
Therefore, despite such conduct runs contrary to the objectives of the Treaty, refusal to 
exercise respective analysis and presuming of the conduct at issue abusive as such would 
amount to depriving the undertaking of its right to defence96. As observed in a comment to 
the Opinion at issue, “it is important to add that a per se approach would also conflict with 
the rationale of Article 82 of EC Treaty, whose objective is to preserve the competitive 
process as a means to protect consumer welfare”97. In that regard when assessing the 
influence of a conduct in question on the welfare of consumers it is necessary to consider 
not only its negative aspects, but also the prospective benefits98. Existence of the well 
reasoned theoretical basis precluding a per se approach in relation of Article 102 TFEU 
clearly ensures the coherence between the two Opinions. The Court of Justice in its turn 
implicitly agreed with the reasoning provided above by declaring that in order to 
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determine whether the refusal to supply constitutes an abuse, “it must be examined 
whether there are objective considerations based on which such a practice cannot be 
regarded as an abuse of the dominant position occupied by that undertaking”99. 
Objective Justification 
The discrepancies between Syfait I and Sot Lélos cases however originate from the 
approaches towards the possibility of justification of a conduct that prima facie seems to 
be anti-competitive. Due to the fact that both AG Colomer and the ECJ have taken similar 
position to this issue, it seems reasonable to concentrate on the judgement of the Court. 
The well-established case law of the Commission and the ECJ has traditionally 
disregarded considerations of economic character as objective justification of abusive 
conduct100. The present case does not seem to be an exception. Both AG and the ECJ 
expressly rejected GSK’s argumentation (almost identical to GSK Spain case) stating that 
the very special nature of parallel trade in pharmaceuticals precludes the benefits for final 
consumers, which traditionally result from development of intra-brand competition. The 
argument that price regulation shielding the market of pharmaceuticals form a normal way 
of functioning may preclude the application of respective provisions of the Treaty has also 
been dismissed. Despite the AG and the Court devoted significant attention to 
argumentation of their positions, which is definitely worth taking into consideration, there 
is however no point to conduct its comprehensive analysis within this research, provided 
that the reasoning in question is irrelevant for the further discussion. 
Restrictions on parallel trade have generally been subject to prohibition under 
Article 101(1) TFEU. In that light, the GSK Greece case is one of the first cases before the 
ECJ to deal with the issue of parallel trade restrictions as a result of unilateral abusive 
conduct. Due to the lack of relevant case law, the ECJ referred to the respective practice 
under Article 101(1) TFEU, where any agreements aiming at limitation of parallel trade 
were regarded anti-competitive per se. This general attitude to parallel trade protection 
was transferred by the Court to the cases on the abuse of dominant position. Thus, in Sot 
Lélos ruling the ECJ emphasised that “there can be no escape from the prohibition laid 
down in Article 82 EC for the practices of an undertaking in a dominant position which 
are aimed at avoiding all parallel exports …, practices which, …, neutralise the benefits of 
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effective competition in terms of the supply and the prices that those exports would obtain 
for final consumers…”101. In other words, by doing so the Court acknowledged that 
consumer protection shall be regarded as a fundamental goal of the TFEU and in principle 
provided a “quasi-exemption” within the Article 102 TFEU for those restrictions, which 
do not negatively affect the welfare of final consumers. 
This being so, the Court took into consideration the argument raised by GSK, that 
even though special features of pharmaceutical sector as such are not sufficient for 
justification of an abusive conduct, they were the reason why GSK had to limit supplies of 
the pharmaceuticals in order to avoid the risk of reduction in the investments to the 
research and development of medicines. The ECJ explicitly stated that in the light of 
Treaty objectives to protect consumers, “even if the degree of regulation regarding the 
price of medicines cannot prevent any refusal by a pharmaceuticals company in a 
dominant position to meet orders sent to it by wholesalers involved in parallel exports 
from constituting an abuse, such a company must nevertheless be in a position to take 
steps that are reasonable and in proportion to the need to protect its own commercial 
interest”102. Provided that the findings of the Court open broad possibilities of abusive 
conduct justification for research-oriented businesses, the ECJ introduced the relevant test 
aimed at assessment of the proportionality of the restrictive measure in question. This test 
however concerns a very case specific aspect of refusal to supply, which limits its 
practical implication to such kinds of cases only. Moreover, it remains unclear whether it 
is only the pharmaceutical sector, which can benefit from the judgement at issue, or the 
policy of “objective considerations” may be applicable for any situations of similar 
character. 
One way or another, it is for the future case law to answer the questions which will 
arise in context of the decisions taken in GSK Spain and GSK Greece cases, and therefore 
it is obvious that the Glaxo Saga is still very far from its end. However, the approach 
demonstrated by the Court in Sot Lélos is rather reasoned and consistent with the general 
trend to modernization of the parallel trade enforcement policy and re-assessment of 
consumer welfare doctrine, which began with the CFI ruling in GSK Spain case. “The 
jurisprudence seems to have abandoned the approach to the provision as a per se or quasi 
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per se prohibition in favour of a rule of reason” and the concept of efficiency gains103. 
While staying from the formal point of view in line with the well-established case law on 
abuse of dominant position, the Sot Lélos case however serves as the much needed 
compromise reached by the ECJ in order to ensure sustainable development of the sector 
in question, which due to its very special features did not fit into the general model of 
competition enforcement. 
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5 Parallel trade in CES of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
The Common Economic Space between the Russian Federation, Republic of 
Belarus and Republic of Kazakhstan is the result of several decades of integration 
processes between the former republics of the Soviet Union. Thus, in the early 1990’s the 
idea of establishment of a single market was introduced within the framework of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, which was formed right after the break up of the 
USSR. However, due to lack of political influence and legal capacity (competence) the 
CIS was incapable of taking measures necessary to foster economic integration between 
its Members.  
Therefore, in 2000 the Russian Federation initiated establishment of the Eurasian 
Economic Community, the new regional organization with the primary focus on effective 
promotion of “the process of formation of the Customs Union and the Single Economic 
Space”104, which currently comprises 5 Member States105. In accordance with objectives 
of the Treaty, in 2010 the Customs Union was established between Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, which resulted in elimination of internal borders and introduction of the 
common customs tariff and legislation106. Further integration took place when Member 
States of the Customs Union announced the establishment of the Common Economic 
Space (CES), which has been functioning since January 2012. The new form of 
cooperation is to large extent based on the model of the European Union, where the 4 
freedoms constitute the fundamental basis for development of the internal market and 
harmonization of national legislation. In February 2012, the Eurasian Economic 
Commission, which is intended to act as the supranational regulatory authority for the 
Customs Union, began functioning. 
The Court of the EurAsEC began operating in January 2012. Given the similar 
position and competence of the Court in the hierarchy of CES institutions to those of the 
European Court of Justice, there is no doubt that its decisions will be to large extent 
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inspired by the existing case law of the ECJ107. This being so, it seems reasonable to 
briefly assess the possible implications of the European jurisprudence in regard of the 
approaches to regulation of parallel trade. 
Harmonization of legislation within the free trade area has resulted in adoption of 
the common policy on intellectual property rights and competition regulation. The CES 
Agreement on intellectual property rights108 has introduced the regional principle of IPR 
exhaustion, which made possible parallel trade between the Member States. Provided that 
national legislation of the Russian Federation and Belarus has traditionally rendered 
parallel trade illegal, this novelty is a big step forward towards establishment of the 
common market. 
The instrument intended to enforce the development of free movement of goods 
and parallel trade is the Agreement on harmonised competition policy (hereinafter referred 
to as “AHCP”), which however in its present state fails to provide adequate protection to 
those freedoms. Thus, its content seems to be inconsistent with the purpose of working in 
context of supranational relations. The reason for it is rather simple: its fundamental 
provisions have been to significant extent transferred from the national anti-trust 
legislation of the Russian Federation, which of course does not have to deal with the 
problem of partitioning of internal market as a result of anti-competitive agreements and 
behaviour.  
In that respect it is important to notice that unlike TFEU, the AHCP does not 
contain a very broadly formulated article equivalent to Article 101 TFEU, which prohibits 
all kinds of anti-competitive agreements regardless of their horizontal or vertical nature. 
On the contrary, the provisions of AHCP provide different treatment for horizontal and 
vertical agreements. Thus, while the AHCP renders illegal horizontal agreements, which 
may result in segmentation of product market on the territorial principle (relevant for 
national markets as well), it completely ignores the possibility of partitioning of the single 
market through vertical restrains. Vertical agreements are explicitly prohibited only in 
case they are aimed at resale price maintenance or imposing of obligations on the 
distributor not to deal with the products of competitive suppliers. However, in regard of 
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anti-competitive agreements the AHCP contains another “reserve” article, which leaves a 
possibility to prohibit such vertical and horizontal agreements, which are “capable of 
distortion of competition” within the internal market. Such a broad definition may in 
principle cover the above-mentioned imperfections, which of course will be the matter of 
further case law on its interpretation. One may assume that in line with the concept of 
restrictions by object in competition law of the EU, the AHCP aims at drawing a line 
between the practices which are restrictive per se (the explicitly mentioned types of 
vertical and horizontal restrains), and the practices where actual negative effect on 
competition shall take place for them to fall under within the scope of a “reserve” article. 
The AHCP does not contain an explicit prohibition of territorial restrictions 
through abuse of dominant position as well, and the only possible solution in that case is 
the interpretation of general prohibition for dominant undertakings to take actions that 
cause or can cause distortion of competition in the common market. However, the account 
shall be taken of the fact that despite AHCP obviously lacks certainty regarding territorial 
restrictions, the advantage of it shall be taken by the EurAsEC Court, which is authorised 
to deliver interpretation of its provisions.  
In any event, it is clear that the current version of AHCP does not expressly 
stipulate the policy of parallel trade protection, which would foster effective enforcement 
by the Court of EurAsEC of the internal market goals. This being so, one shall admit that 
re-assessment and interpretation of the AHCP provisions in the context of supranational 
integration is of primary importance for further development of CES. It is the EurAsEC 
Court who will have to formulate the fundamental policy and approaches towards the 
issue of parallel trade, and in that respect the jurisprudence of the ECJ and case law of the 
European Commission will be of superior value in order to ensure the proper functioning 
of internal market and hence integration within the CES. 
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6 Conclusion 
As it has been determined in the beginning of this paper, its main goal is to review 
and analyse the development of the concept of parallel trade limitation as a hard-core 
restriction in the European Union law during the time through assessment of relevant 
legislation, case law and academic researches within the context of competition law. 
Provided that Article 34 TFEU still expressly motivates the per se approach under Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU by declaring any restrictions to free movement incompatible with the 
EU law, the main focus in that regard has been made to the assessment of respective 
novels introduced through the recent judgments in GSK Spain and Greece cases. 
Therefore, it seems necessary to summarise their main outcomes, which are of 
special importance for practical implication. The first thing to be stated is that in GSK 
Spain the ECJ expressly reaffirmed the principle that agreements impeding trade between 
Member States are regarded anti-competitive “by object”. Despite different nature of 
prohibition laid down in Article 102 TFEU, almost equal treatment for abusive practices 
aimed at restriction of parallel trade has been introduced in GSK Greece, where only very 
special “objective considerations” may save the dominant company from being caught by 
the prohibition. 
Secondly, the Court confirmed that prohibition of the agreements under Article 
101(1) TFEU does not require any proof of adverse effect on final customers, regardless 
of specific nature of some markets. In other words, special features of certain markets as 
such cannot be regarded as the conditions, which may preclude application of Article 
101(1) TFEU. This ruling stays in line with GSK Greece case, where the Court equally 
refused to treat considerations of purely economic nature as sufficient to exclude the 
abusive nature of dominant company’s behaviour. 
However, the third, and probably the most significant issue introduced in GSK 
Spain case is the assumption that hardcore infringements of Article 101(1) “by object” can 
nevertheless be objectively justified under 101(3) TFEU by reference to the concept of 
consumer welfare and the rule of reason. As discussed above, this development would be 
a very helpful instrument for the undertakings to avoid being caught by excessively strict 
policy on parallel trade protection. Similarly, the Court appealed to the concept of 
consumer welfare in context of “objective considerations” under Article 102 TFEU. 
Fourthly, the Court introduced the requirement on the standard and burden of proof 
by stating that in order to rely on exemption under Article 101(3) an undertaking must 
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provide sufficient evidence for the Commission showing that infringement of Article 
101(1) has positive effects for final consumers, while the Commission is obliged to 
properly examine all of them taking into account special features of certain business 
sectors and motivating its decisions in case it finds those evidence inadequate. 
Comparable, in regard of Article 102 TFEU the Court offered a test aimed at deciding 
whether the abusive measure is adequate for the purpose of protecting commercial 
interests and therefore contributing into development of the consumers’ welfare. This last 
point seems to be very favourable for the undertakings seeking an exemption (or the 
quasi-exemption under Article 102 TFEU), as it would give them much more flexibility in 
reasoning their positions.  
All those aspects together form a good example of derogation from the policies on 
parallel trade protection making the discussed cases doubtlessly a landmark in the long-
standing development of parallel trade in the European Union. The GSK Greece and Spain 
cases demonstrate the much-needed shift towards the approaches, where the welfare of 
final consumers and the rule of reason are of the same value as the purpose of 
establishment of the internal market and protection of competition as such. This being so, 
it is the future case law of the ECJ and the Commission, which will make the most 
comprehensive and balanced assessment of the discussed novels and demonstrate their 
actual consequences for the enforcement of competition policy in the European Union. 
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